Introduction
Over the past few years, Icelandic water law has been undergoing a review. The review work has revealed a fundamental disagreement over how landowners' water rights should be defined: as private property or as limited rights of use derived from the nation as the owner? The intensity of the debate is likely rooted in a broader social debate over private property rights in natural resources and the fair distribution of the benefits of utilisation. The social debate has elicited a public call for a constitutional provision declaring all natural resources the common property of the nation. The term 'property of the nation' has no sound basis in Icelandic property law and earlier proposals for application of the term in the Constitution have been criticized in legal writings due to the ambiguity of the term.
1 This paper examines the concept in light of recent proposals for amendments to the Constitution put forward in the Parliament (the Althing) as well as recent recommendations of the Constitutional Council. 2 In essence, the proposals and recommendations are based on the idea that all natural resources that are not private property should be declared 'property of the nation'.
This paper attempts to identify the main drivers of the social debate over private property rights to water and asks how the question of landowners' rights to water should be approached under Icelandic law. It also discusses the issues: based on possible interpretations of the concept 'property of the nation', what implications does the proposed constitutional provision have in relation to the legal and social considerations raised.
The paper's discussion is limited to the Icelandic social and legal situation and, thus, does not provide a comparative view, which could be a topic for a separate paper. The paper begins with a brief introduction of the basic principles of Icelandic property law concerning real property, the terminology used in the paper and an outline of the current water law regime. It then addresses the controversial revision of the current law and attempts to explain the legal and social conflict it has raised. Next, the content of landowners' surface and groundwater rights is explored further and the proposed amendments to the Constitution is examined. The paper suggests that use of the terms 'property' and 'ownership' in relation to landowners' water rights brings expectations of control that are not warranted if the physical nature of the resource and jurisprudence is considered. However, landowners' rights of use are extensive and largely preempt all property rights to be held in relation to water. The paper argues that the proposed constitutional provisions could 'ring-fence' water rights that are currently held by the State within public lands, but that outside public lands there is not much left for the nation 'to own'. The balance between public and private interests in water within private land continues to be decided on the basis of the powers of the legislator to lay down general restrictions on private property rights for the purpose of safeguarding public interests within the limits of art 72 of the Constitution. However, it is possible that the proposed application of the concept 'property of the nation' affects that balance in favour of public interests.
Basic principles of Icelandic property law governing real property
Historically, land and its resources have been subjected to private property rights under Icelandic law. The establishment of private ownership of land can be traced back to the time of settlement in Iceland (AD 870-930) when the first settlers took possession of large areas of land.
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Those areas of land were gradually divided into smaller plots and changed hands by inheritance, purchase, gift etc. The old law books include various provisions on landowners' rights and relations to other landowners. 4 They include, inter alia, provisions on water uses known at the time, that is agricultural household use, freshwater fishing and small-scale livestock breeding. 5 It has been argued that the terminology used in the old law books, including the verb 'to own' cannot be interpreted on the basis of current usage. 6 In fact, the term 'property right' or 'ownership'
does not have a fixed meaning in Icelandic legal terminology. In Nordic legal terminology, including Icelandic, the term 'private property right' or 'ownership'/'direct ownership' entails the right of control over a certain asset insofar as there are no restrictions on such right by way of contract or law. The substantive right therefore broadens to the extent that restrictions diminish or disappear. 'Limited' or 'indirect' proprietary rights, such as the right of use, are derivate rights that are based on the owner's property right. The definition of landowner's property rights to water was by far the most controversial issue during the preparation of the 1923 Water Act. The disagreement was rooted in differing opinions of both a political and legal nature. The preparatory committee for the drafting of the Bill was split into two schools. 27 The majority followed what has been named 'the public rights school'.
This group claimed that water should be defined as either common property or State property. It proposed that landowners should have the right to certain uses of water on their land, relating primarily to household, farming and minor industry. The minority followed what has been named the 'private rights school', which rejected the notion that landowners' rights should be limited to certain uses and proposed that landowners should have the full right of 'possession and use' of surface water on their land to the extent that there were no limits laid down by law or contract. In the explanatory notes with the legislative Bill, the minority explains that it did not use the word 'ownership' in order to avoid the misunderstanding that the disagreement within the committee concerned the question of whether water as a substance could be owned.
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From the bills and their attached explanatory notes, it can be deduced that at the centre of the political debate lay the question of whether landowners should be entitled to compensation for use of water for power production that did not interfere with landowners' reasonable use of water for their household, farming or small scale industry needs. The legal disagreement related 21 For a further account of the ongoing proceedure on the division between 'public' and 'private land' and a map of the areas that have been decided upon and those that remain undecided upon, see Óbyggðanefnd <http://www.obyggdanefnd.is>. 'own' the waters on their land. In the course of preparation of that Act and in later preparation for amending the 1887 Act, the definition of ownership of waterfalls was discussed and debated in Norway. Landowners' rights to small non-flowing waters, such as ponds are, on the other hand, defined in negative terms, cf art 9. The Act lists the user rights of landowners, pursuant to art 2, and prioritises the competing uses of landowners and other users of the same water. Abstraction of water for household and farming takes precedence over other utilisation of water. Next in the line comes abstraction for industry operated on the land, then irrigation and, after irrigation, power production. 29 The Act also defines public rights to water. It states that anyone can take water for household and farming purposes provided the abstraction is not to the detriment of the landowner. Also, anyone can use water for swimming and transport in accordance with the law. 30 Furthermore, the Act limits landowners' use rights by imposing license requirements for various water developments.
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It has been the general view of scholars throughout the 20 th century that since the Act lists all uses of any significance, including power production, the view of the minority of the water law committee prevailed. 32 It has been argued that surface water rights, like minerals and other ground resources, are part of the property rights of landowners and protected as such under art 72 of the Constitution. 33 In more recent literature, these views have been criticised on the principal grounds that water is not subject to direct ownership of landowners, and landowners' rights are subjected to far reaching limitations for protecting public interests. 34 However, there seems to be a general consensus by legal scholars that by the enactment of the 1923 Water Act it was established beyond doubt that landowners hold certain use rights, including the right to utilisation of the energy of the rivers flowing through their properties and that those rights enjoy protection under art 72 of the Constitution.
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The
Act on the Survey and Utilisation of Ground Resources
The Water Act No 15/1923 only covers surface water. Groundwater use was of limited relevance at the time when the Act was adopted. Today, nearly a century later, groundwater serves approximately 95 per cent of household consumption and geothermal resources serve most of the needs for hot water and heating. 36 It was not until 1998 that comprehensive legislation governing groundwater rights was adopted. At that time the prevailing view in legal literature was that groundwater formed a part of land ownership and that landowners had the exclusive right to the use of groundwater beneath their land within the limits set by law or the rights of third parties. The GRA does not lay down any limits with respect to how deep into the ground landowners' rights reach. The question of whether such limits should be established had been the subject of debate for decades. 42 In legal literature, the general view has been that landowners' rights extend as far as may be considered reasonable from the perspective of the interests of the landowner. Landowners hold the right to utilise ground resources like other property in the manner, and to the extent, that such properties are ordinarily used (rule of ordinary use). 43 It can be deduced from recent Supreme Court judgments that this rule still prevails after the enactment of the GRA. 44 The judgments can also be read to the effect that ground resources that have no economic value, in the sense that their utilisation 'could never yield profit' are not to be regarded as 'natural resources' covered by art 3 of the GRA and thus not subject to the property rights of landowners. 45 In real terms, the rule of ordinary use only seems to set the limit of landowners' rights based on what is technically and economically feasible at any given time.
The proposed reforms to current water law -the legal and social conflict
The reforms The stated aim of the 2006 Water Act is, inter alia, to lay down clear rules on the ownership of water. 49 In that spirit, it takes a holistic approach to water rights and covers all running or static water on the surface of the earth and underground. 50 The controversial provision on landowners' rights to water states that 'any real estate, including public land, includes ownership of water on or under property or flowing through the property'. 51 Essentially, the wording and the approach in defining landowners' water rights is the same as that of the GRA: they are expressed by the use of the term 'ownership' and defined in negative terms and not by providing a positive list of use rights. The explanatory notes to the legislative Bill explains that the proposed amendments to the definition of landowners' property rights relate primarily to form and not to substance. rights to surface water and groundwater is maintained. Considering that primarily groundwater is used for consumption in Iceland, it is questionable that this legislative amendment alone will satisfy those who claim that water, being essential to all life, should not be in private ownership. The social and legal conflict raised by the 2006 Water Act will now be further explained.
Underlying issues -the social conflict
In the course of preparations for the 2006 Water Act the nearly century-old debate on public versus private rights to water resurfaced, albeit in a different social context. In the sphere of the past century, Iceland gained full independence and developed from a poor agricultural society to an industrialised urban society with a strong internationalised economy. Concurrently, land uses are much different and management needs more complex, raising issues of conflicts between different uses and how to best ensure sustainable development. In this respect, large scale energy projects for serving power-intensive industry has, in recent years, proven to be particularly controversial. In very simplified terms, the conflict is based on differing views on how to balance the interests related to nature conservation and industrial development.
As already noted, historically, water uses in Iceland were basically restricted to surface water and predominantly for household needs and livestock farming. 58 In the early 20 th century, industrialisation opened up new utilisation possibilities, most importantly those related to energy. Similarly, water supply is a public service, carried out by the municipalities or utilities owned by them. 61 Over the course of the years, in relation to energy development and groundwater extraction, public utilities acquired important water rights through agreements with landowners or via expropriation. 62 It could be argued that this public façade of water uses has created a gap between how the general public perceives water -that is, as public domain -and the content of the law.
In 2003, the electricity market opened up for competition in both the production and sale of electricity. 63 The liberalisation carried ideas of privatisation of public energy utilities and, in
2007, large shares in one of the major energy utilities 64 were sold to a private company. It is safe to say that those ideas met with much scepticism by the general public and further privatisation of public energy utilities was halted. Security of energy supply, access to clean water, environmental considerations and regional development are all interests that were cited in justification of legislative amendments enacted in 2008 with the aim to 'ring-fence' water and geothermal rights owned by the State and public entities. 65 As a result, the State, municipalities and public entities were prohibited from directly or indirectly transferring their water rights and geothermal rights to private parties. 66 When, in 2009 and 2010, a foreign company acquired a major share in the one energy company that had been privatised, strong reservations regarding Iceland's sovereign rights to its resources were raised. In fact, it is safe to say that the foreign acquisition caused political turbulence and a public outcry. It was followed by a call for measures to be taken to regain public ownership of the utility. 67 An administrative committee was set up to review the legality of the sale under Icelandic law governing foreign investment. 68 With certain reservations, it concluded that the law had not been violated. 69 The fact that the company did not have any permanent rights to geothermal energy but leased the right to use from the respective municipalities (65-year lease with a right to enter into negotiation for an extension) seemed to have limited sway in the public debate. The protests raised are difficult to comprehend without a full grasp of all the facts. In essence, and for the purpose of this paper, it suffices to note that the debate, both on the privatisation of public energy utilities and on foreign investment in such utilities, reveals that the social conflict on private ownership of water and geothermal resources centres today, as in the beginning of the 20 th Century, to a large extent on public versus private control over the resources and appropriate means to ensure that the economic benefit accrues to the nation. However, as reflected in the 2008 legislative amendments, the need to ensure public control is today based on a set of a more complex and _____________________________________________________________________________
Special Edition International Journal of Rural Law and Policy 9
Water Law: Through the Lens of Conflict diversified public interests that relate inter alia to: increased awareness of the intrinsic value of nature and the need to prioritise between different uses of water and land (for example tourism versus industry) and the value of Iceland's water resources in light of the global quest for secure supply of energy and clean drinking water.
As pointed out by the Water Law Committee, the conflict on public versus private rights to water should also be seen as part of a broader debate on public rights to natural resources in general, most importantly living marine resources. 70 The establishment of a general system of permanent Individual Transferable Quotas ('ITQs') in the fishery management regime in the 1990's has raised fundamental constitutional questions of equitable access to the resources 71 and a political debate on the fair distribution of benefits as well as the effect of the ITQs system on regional development. The nature and content of the rights established through the allocation of permanent ITQs and their protection under art 72 of the Constitution has, in the past decades, been the subject of constant debate in legal literature. Most legal writers are of the view that the ITQs enjoy protection under art 72 of the Constitution as occupational right only and the legislator has powers to change the ITQ system without compensating the right holders. 72 However, the view has also been expressed that ITQs enjoy protection under art 72 of the Constitution as private property.
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Admittedly, there are certain similarities between the conflict over the ITQ system and the conflict on property rights to water. Both relate to private property rights in fugacious natural resources of fundamental national interest and the core issue of debate is on how to ensure that the benefits of exploitation of the resources accrue to the nation. However, there are dissimilarities. First, the social conflict with respect to water is very much related to strong opposition against privatisation of public energy utilities, whereas it is not a matter of concern that the fishery sector is operated fully by private entities. Second, the question of access to water is mainly related to concerns about security of supply, whereas the question of access to the fisheries resource is on equal right to exploit the resource. Third, as further explained below, the legal debate on private property rights in water is mainly related to the question of whether landowners' water rights should be defined in terms of indirect or direct property rights, whereas, as mentioned above, the legal debate on the property status of ITQs is on whether they should enjoy protection under art 72 of the Constitution only as occupational rights. In light of the last point in particular, it is pertinent to ask whether there is any correlation between the social conflict on property rights in water and the claim for a provision in the Constitution declaring natural resources not in private ownership as 'property of the nation'. Before addressing the notion, it is appropriate to further explore the content of landowners' property rights to water.
The content of landowners' property rights to water -the legal conflict
It has been argued that applying the term 'ownership' in relation to water instead of the right of 'possession and use' changes the form of ownership from indirect (use rights) to direct ownership (which implies that water as a 'substance' is subjected to ownership) and that direct ownership, carries stronger rights of exclusion than use rights. 74 The changed wording, it is contended, could 70 Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism, above n 53, 15. alter the way in which the content of landowners' rights is construed and possibly strengthen landowners' rights to surface water.
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In this paper, the argument is that generally it is correct that direct ownership entails stronger ownership control than use rights. That is, however, not absolute as it depends on the subject of 'ownership'. The relationship between an owner and his or her property, that is, the possibility to control and use property, is dependent on the characteristics of the property. 76 Thus, it should be examined whether the physical nature of the subject of 'ownership' excludes any other control than that related to use. Running water (surface water and underground water), just like wild animals and fish, is a fugacious resource in the sense that it flows constantly. This means that for reasons of certain physical characteristics of a resource an 'owner' would lack control over the resource as such in terms of exclusivity. That being said, it is necessary to stress that the content of landowners' rights cannot be properly defined without an in-depth analysis of the many and far-reaching rules of public law that restrict landowners' water rights on the grounds of public interests. In this context it should be recalled that the scope of the restrictions that the legislator can impose within the limits of the Constitution is dependent upon a number of factors that must be assessed together; and one important factor is the significance of the interests at stake. 80 With respect to water, it could be argued that the legislator has a broad discretionary scope for imposing restrictions on landowners' water rights in order to, inter alia, ensure a sufficient supply of clean water for sustaining life and the environment. The limits are, as previously mentioned, difficult to define in absolute terms.
Over the course of the last century, public law limitations on private property rights to natural resources have developed synchronously with societal changes. Based on the above, it can be argued that the term 'ownership' brings certain expectations, both in general language and legal terminology, and has diffused the social conflict on property rights in water. The content of landowners' rights should be analysed on the basis of the physical characteristics of the resources and the public interests vested in it. 82 The balance between public and private rights to water under the current legal regime is, to a large extent, decided by public law and the limits set by art 72 of the Constitution. 83 In light of that, it is tempting to approach the concept of 'property of the nation' -as applied in recent proposals and recommendations for constitutional amendments -with a view to shed at least a faint light on how such a constitutional provision meets the social and legal debate on property rights to water.
The concept 'property of the nation' and proposals for its constitutional status
As mentioned earlier, the term 'property of the nation' does not have a sound basis in Icelandic property law. The concept appears in various Acts without a clear reference to its content. 84 Notably, it is referred to in the Fisheries Management Act, where exploitable marine resources are referred to as the 'common property of the nation.' 85 The notion was introduced into the Fisheries Management Act with the aim of emphasising that ITQs should not create irrevocable property rights. 86 The fishery management regime has been under constant review in the past decades in an attempt to reconcile differing interests and views. In this quest, a committee of experts and political representatives was elected by the Althing in 1998 to address natural resources that are, or could become, common property of the Icelandic nation (the Natural Resources Committee). In its report in the year 2000 the Committee put forward a proposal for a constitutional provision declaring any natural resources not in private ownership to be the 'common property of the Icelandic nation'. 87 
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It could be argued, based on recent proposals and recommendations that there are two principal schools on what should be the substantive content of a constitutional provision on natural resources. First, that such a provision should entail a declaration reinforcing the powers and duty of the State to manage natural resources on the basis of national interests (excluding any reference to the concept of 'property of the nation'). 90 It has also been argued that the concept 'property of the nation' could be construed to this effect. 91 Second, that in addition it creates a form of a distinct institution of 'property' that could be described as an antithesis of private property. It would mean that natural resources are either subject to private ownership or 'ownership' of the nation. If applied, this interpretation resembles in many respects the division between private and public land under the PLA. The institution 'State property' within Public Land and 'property of the nation' would also have common characteristics. Both would confer the 'ownership' control to the State and impose certain obligations on the State to exercise its control for the benefit of the nation. Interpreted to this effect, 'property of the nation' would replace all forms of property right to natural resources (most notably commons and public property) with the important exception of private property and indirect property rights, such as use rights pursuant to the 1923 Water Act. The paper argues that this meaning can be read into above-mentioned proposals presented in the Althing and with certain reservations also into the recommendations of the Constitutional Council.
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If the first school is applied and 'property of the nation' is only meant to reinforce State powers to manage natural resources, the concept could apply to all resources equally, that is both within public and private land, and irrespective of existing property rights held by private and public parties. The second school, on the other hand, is based on a distinction between natural resources subject to private property rights and those that are not. Obviously water resources within public lands would be considered 'property of the nation'. As for water resources within private land, the question of whether water is subject to direct ownership would continue to be debated. Even if it were accepted that water as a substance is not private property and could thus be considered 'property of the nation', the substantive effect of that would be limited. Presumably existing property rights to water (use rights) would be unaffected, at least as long as there is no clear provision on nationalisation of those rights. Moreover, water rights acquired by public entities on a private law basis would not be considered 'property of the nation' and legislative amendments allowing privatisation of such public entities not be excluded. Based on the above, it is argued that the only clear effect of a constitutional provision declaring natural resources that are not private property 'property of the nation' is that water resources within public land would be 'ring fenced' in the sense that the legislator's power to alter their legal status would be limited. In addition, it could be argued, both versions entail a constitutional reinforcement of public interests attached to natural resources that could affect the balance test of art 72 of the Constitution on public versus private interests in favour of public interests. 
